This article examines police administration as a branch of urban government, based on a casestudy of Leeds between 1815 and 1900. Making extensive use of local government and police records, it takes a longer-term view of 'reform' than most existing studies, and privileges the more routine aspects of everyday governance. It thus provides an original exploration of centrallocal government relations, as well as conflict and negotiation between distinct bodies of selfgovernment within the locality. Previous studies have rightly emphasised that urban police governance was primarily a local responsibility, yet this article also stresses the growing influence of central state oversight and an extra-local, provincial perspective, both of which modified the grip of localism on nineteenth-century government. 
governance and its capacity to adapt to changing times. 3 This view is often (though not always) complemented by the contention that the Victorian state was above all a local state, and that central government intrusion into local affairs made only modest progress before the turn of the twentieth century. 4 Thus, according to Philip Harling, 'if it is in any sense accurate to talk about a late-Victorian "revolution in government", this was emphatically a revolution carried out through local means, and chiefly for local reasons.'
5
Despite its engagement with such wider historiography, much work on the history of police governance is undermined by excessive chronological or topical specificity. In particular, much of the literature remains preoccupied with the moment of reform.
Historians have long been aware that the transition from the 'old' to the 'new' police masked significant continuities in practice, and almost every local study has borne this point out. 6 Given that such works call the short-term significance of reform into question, Harling, 'Centrality of locality', pp.217-18. The phrase 'revolution in government' refers to the debate which followed Oliver MacDonagh's classic article: 'The nineteenth-century revolution in government: a reappraisal', The Historical Journal, i (1958), pp.52-67. 6 it is surprising that few historians have analysed police administration over an extended period. 7 Admittedly, recent studies of the police labour force have adopted a longer-term perspective, which is most welcome. However, for the historian of local government, these studies are unduly restrictive, dealing with the management of men rather than the governance of the police more broadly. 8 As a result of these patterns of scholarship, much attention has been lavished upon rather obvious, organisational changes, at the expense of more subtle shifts in everyday governance.
The present article seeks to remedy this problem, by providing an analysis of police governance in a single locality (Leeds) over a rather longer period, from the formation of the night watch in 1815, to the turn of the twentieth century. One consequence of this extended scope is a necessarily selective analysis. What follows does not evaluate the 'quality' of urban governance and the social status of the political elite, 9 nor does it assess how changes in administration impacted upon policing in practice. Committee. Of course, such local sources do not capture fully the role of the central state in police organisation; however, they do register points at which the decisions of central administrators impacted substantively on local affairs, as well as providing a fairly consistent evidential basis on which to assess changing patterns of police governance at the local level.
This article is divided into four parts. The first underlines the predominance of local governing elites in nineteenth-century police administration, by extending beyond the moment of reform to the mundane world of everyday police administration. The second further emphasises the importance of local self-government by analysing the relationship between centres and localities -first between Leeds In the decades that followed, the borough magistrates responsible for police administration displayed a recurrent appetite for organisational reform. By the 1820s, they saw fit to hire additional salaried officers to help direct the day police in the winter months: an 'Assistant Constable' was appointed in 1826, and two more were in office by 1828. 13 Following a shocking robbery upon the Mayor one evening in 1833, an additional force of 'patroles' was established to safeguard the streets at dusk, ensuring continual surveillance in the evening before the night watch took to their beats. 14 Moreover, the justices recognised the need to make periodic additions to the force, to keep pace with rapid urbanisation and population growth. By 1836, the watch had grown substantially:
12 inspectors and 71 watchmen patrolled the streets for 34 weeks of the year, reduced to daily on Sundays. 39 The mounting volume of paper required to ensure the police establishment functioned effectively also made its way down to the individual constable.
In 1882, the men were each issued with a 'memorandum book', in which they would 'carefully record…the names of persons whom they intend proceeding against to consolidate smaller borough forces with the county police, and to place borough constables under effective command of the county chief constable. 44 The Bill was subsequently amended and passed, having abandoned these contentious provisions, and left the consolidation of county and borough forces at the discretion of local governors. 45 In the eighteen-fifties, a more serious and protracted struggle developed concerning the division of police governance between the centre and the localities. Between 1836 and 1856, this division of authority produced a dialogue between the Council and the out-townships concerning police provision. Thus, parallel to 'centrallocal' negotiation between London and the borough, there was also a 'centre-periphery' relation within the borough itself. From the perspective of central Leeds reformers, the exemption of the out-townships from the watch district was irrational; this view was itself grounded in the 'migratory thesis', which held that criminals would migrate from areas of high police concentration to localities with relatively sparse provision. 63 Thus in 1836, amidst much liberal enthusiasm for reform, the Leeds Times welcomed the new police as a 'decided improvement upon that previously in operation', and argued that 'before long it will become absolutely necessary to extend it to the whole of the out-townships, where the thieves, who are so closely and so continuously watched in the town, will be driven to commit depredations'. 64 Such arguments proved influential amongst some residents on the periphery, especially in the more urban settlements: the Watch Committee soon received petitions from Hunslet and Headingley, calling for the extension of the police to encompass their townships (the latter specifically claimed that reform had forced delinquents out to the suburbs). 65 The eighteen-forties saw further such requests from both townships, as well as from Potternewton. 66 However, debate about the extension of the new police to the out-townships was by no means one-sided. Occasionally, outlying residents sought to harness municipal authority in a rather more flexible way. enforcement of street order -was less obviously applicable to such places, and so the rationale for extending the new police throughout the borough remained unclear at a local level. 75 However, out-township opposition to police reform also rested on pride in local self-government. Just as the boroughs clung tenaciously to rights of local control over policing in the eighteen-forties and eighteen-fifties, such tiny localities as the Leeds outtownships likewise defended their own traditions of self-government. 76 Besides being expensive and inappropriate, the Leeds Police was an alien force, the imposition of which symbolised a loss of local control. This is not to suggest that the out-township constituencies possessed some inherent unity: they experienced acute internal political divisions, especially over rating issues, which took shape according to particular local circumstances. However, as Robin Pearson argued, such local in-fighting was set aside when rates were imposed from outside, or when external agencies threatened to enforce political consolidation throughout the borough. 77 There are hints of such localist sentiments in the petitions. The inhabitants of Bramley underlined that the extension of the Leeds Police would offend local sensibilities, as an imposition: 'your Memorialists…pray that no police may be sent into this Township.' 78 Perhaps there is a trace of it in the Chapel-Allerton petition too, which flatly rebuffed the notion of extension, 'believing the same to be wholly unnecessary and uncalled for'. 79 The out-townships were not opposed to police innovation in principle; in fact, there is evidence of township governments providing additional police resources of their own in the early nineteenth century. In Beeston, there were attempts to erect a lockup in 1823, 80 and in the eighteen-fifties they even consulted on engaging the services of policemen employed in the city. 81 By the eighteen-forties, the inhabitants of Wortley regularly elected a 'Chief Constable' -who presumably acted as a supervising officerand late in 1855 they met to consider lighting and watching the township, for the 'preservation of life and property'. 82 The issue was not, then, blanket hostility to new forms of police, or casual disregard for the threat of crime; rather, the out-townships were determined to ensure adequate police provision, but strictly on their own terms. Such aspirations to local political control -both within the out-townships and on the part of the Town Council -came under mounting pressure from the eighteen-fifties, and the central state assumed an augmented role in the administration of local police forces.
***
As we have seen, several historians now portray the nineteenth century as a golden age of localism in government and politics. They argue correctly that their predecessorscaptivated by 'blue books', government commissions, inspectorates and the likeexaggerated the impact and effectiveness of central reform in nineteenth-century social policy, and so the consequent erosion of local autonomy. However, the pendulum must not be allowed to swing too far the other way. Amongst police historians, there now seems little dispute that nineteenth-century administration was driven overwhelmingly by 80 according to different systems and logics. It permitted the kind of division of local authority which developed within Leeds, as independent bodies of self-government maintained separate forms of police. In other words, it allowed the formation of precisely that chaos of local particularism which central administrators came increasingly to resent between the eighteen-thirties and eighteen-fifties. Hence, in the mid-nineteenth century, the role of the central state progressively mutated, as it increasingly sought to prescribe the form of local police forces and (within broad terms) how they were to be governed.
The first major consequence of this new approach was the 1835 Municipal
Corporations Act. Besides overhauling the old, closed corporations and installing elected town councils, this measure obliged incorporated boroughs to establish their own police forces. In Leeds, the political consequences of this legislation were profound, allowing the liberal section of the urban elite to attain major local political power for the first time. 87 In this heady atmosphere of reform, the newly-elected councillors expressed considerable confidence in 'the system of the Metropolitan Police' to effect 'a material diminution of both Crime and Expense'. 88 However, in reality, the practical impact of the 1835 Act on police provision was modest. True, the new force would now maintain full strength all year round, in contrast to the seasonal reduction in manpower under the night watch. Yet in terms of personnel, there was much continuity: most senior officers in the 'new' police were already in service prior to 1836, and it seems that the night watchmen were simply transferred over to the new police. 'inefficient' boroughs, but also in such large and sophisticated forces as the Leeds Police.
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In Leeds, HMIC's criticisms carried substantial weight, and often resulted in additions to the police establishment. While the record of local reforming initiative was in many respects impressive, grants of additional manpower were usually modest, and it is in this area that HMIC's influence was most tangible. The lever of power in this relationship was the government grant-in-aid, awarded to forces deemed 'efficient', which covered initially one-quarter and later (following the 1874 Police (Expenses) Act) one-half of labour costs. 99 Councillors were rudely introduced to the implications of central funding (and the threat of its suspension) in the early eighteen-sixties. In January the Watch Committee should take into consideration the propriety and advantage of keeping pace with the increase of the population by small and gradual additions in the number of Constables, in order that the increased and constantly increasing acquirements may be met, and provided for as they arise, from time to time within the Borough.
1823, suffered increasingly from illness by mid-century, prompting much debate as to his suitability to continue in post. In 1848, sickness prevented him from attending work for as many as thirteen weeks, 107 while an enquiry in 1850 heard much damning evidence against him, with the secretary to the magistrates recounting how Read had fallen asleep while in court. 108 Following the latter episode, the Watch Committee resolved that 'the retirement of Mr Read from the office of Chief Constable would conduce to the efficiency of the Police Force'. 109 However, he was not forced to resign, and continued to serve, only for ill health later to reassert itself, prompting further complaints from the magistrates in 1855. 110 It was the inauguration of government inspection in 1857 which proved decisive for Read. After Woodford complained about the Chief Constable's condition, the Watch Committee acknowledged he was quite 'worn out by length of service', and gave him three months' notice to retire. 111 However, after the Council intervened to support the ailing officer, this order was rescinded. 112 In this confrontation between local councillors and the inspectorate, the latter eventually prevailed. Just over a year later, the Committee again resolved to retire Read
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-this time with permanent effect -shortly before receiving a letter from the Home Office expressing concern regarding his age and growing infirmity. 114 process, yet Woodford's intervention was surely crucial to securing his departure within eighteen months of the first inspection.
The second case, which concerns levels of police pay, demonstrates that HMIC remained a significant force in local police governance beyond the 1850s. To the central state, discrepancies in pay between local police forces -which were deemed to produce incentives for recruits of higher quality to join forces with higher rates of pay -were a longstanding complaint. The inspectorate selected police pay as a key priority in Leeds from the late 1860s. He went on to recommend that the Committee adopt a still higher scale of pay for superintendents, 'which has been approved by the Secretary of State'. 120 There followed a sub-committee report on the matter, recommending rates of remuneration in line with this 'approved' Home Office scale, 121 which was subsequently adopted by the Council. to the question of the maintenance of the Police Force in in [sic] Boroughs and the tendency of the Government grant to substitute central for local authority. He pointed out that Governments of whatever party they might be were inclined to monopolise power to themselves and thus deprive so far as they were able, Municipal Authorities of their due share of control over their own affairs.
Tatham went on to recount the gradual growth of central state support for local police forces under the various statutes:
Consequently it was now the case in his own Borough that they were receiving from the Government something like £15,000 a year, towards the support of the Police Force. But one great disadvantage attending the current system was that the Government took upon themselves more than a fairly proportionate power in regulating both the numbers of the Police force and their actual pay and a hard and fast line was officially laid down as to the number to be employed.
The Mayor regretted that no consideration was taken of how 'Communities differed', nor that 'the inhabitants and not the Government were naturally the best judges' of such local peculiarities. In the finish, he was unable to carry the meeting on his Committee resolved to enquire into police conditions in other large towns. 136 In matters of pay, councillors were particularly anxious to keep abreast of levels of remuneration in other forces: in order to attract the recruits of the highest quality, they were convinced that wage rates in Leeds had to remain competitive. Hence, such comparisons could be used by others to persuade the Committee that additional expenditure was necessary.
Chief Constable Nott-Bower's appeal to augment superintendents' pay in 1879 was thus supported by a list of remuneration scales in other cities: it showed that, even after the 158 These episodes underscore the reforming potential of newcomers to the force, bringing with them the insight of police experience elsewhere. By contrast, the formation of expert dynasties in municipal services could nurture a pernicious aversion to change in local administration. 159 It bears highlighting in this respect that senior officers were granted increased discretionary authority in day-to-day police governance over the course of the century. 160 than the Watch Committee: Chief Constable Read and Superintendent James were responsible for drawing up books of police beats in the 1840s and 1850s, suggesting that they were probably also responsible for planning patrols. 161 However, as the century progressed, senior officers were granted increasing administrative discretion. At some point, the Watch Committee left the routine business of recruitment to the head of the force, but revoked these powers in 1868, after the size of the force had been allowed to swell under Chief Constable Wetherell's direction. 162 In 1883, with a view to reducing manpower levels, the Watch Committee instructed Chief Constable A.B. Nott-Bower to cease further recruitment, which would suggest that chief constables were usually entrusted with the routine business of hiring by this point. 163 The gradual extension of such autonomy was common in the late nineteenth century, especially concerning the administration of discipline within the ranks. 164 In 1878 -significantly, at the suggestion of HMIC -the Watch Committee conferred upon the Chief Constable power to inflict fines of up to ten shillings for instances of misconduct. 165 By the 1880s, most sanctions were dispensed summarily by the Chief Constable: figures from the largest section of the force ('A' division) show that he took summary jurisdiction in 263 cases between March 1880 and February 1881, while the Committee heard just 22 incidents in the same period. 166 In 1886, the Committee formalised this arrangement by officially handing full control to the Chief Constable in routine cases, and jointly agreeing to a standard, graded system of punishment for cases of police drunkenness. 167 Even superintendents were authorised to determine minor disciplinary matters, independently of the Chief Constable, by 1887. 168 The rationale for to see that the force as constituted between the eighteen-thirties and eighteen-fifties was 167 really a half-way house: between the 'old' day police and night watch of the unreformed Corporation, and the expanded and unified force which policed the borough from 1857.
This article has argued that the governance of nineteenth-century police forces was a complex product of three factors: local governmental initiative; central state oversight; and extra-local, provincial perspective. Throughout the nineteenth centuryindeed, for much of the twentieth -police governance remained explicitly a local responsibility; local governmental activity remained the primary motor of reform. How effectively these men were able to communicate and organise hinged to a considerable extent on reforms implemented by the Watch Committee, and the efforts of chief constables to introduce more efficient information management procedures. By the end of the century, local police forces remained genuinely local; the rationale for enquiring into police administration elsewhere was that one might expect to learn of significant differences in organisation from one force to the next.
However, much of this essay has argued that the purchase of localism should not be exaggerated. There is currently a tendency in the literature to treat governmental localism in rather unproblematic terms. 170 Instead, this essay has demonstrated that, especially during the second half of the nineteenth century, localism in police governance was increasingly modulated by both external and internal developments. Externally, the 1856 Act made a stark impression upon local police provision, and the inspection regime it instituted subjected local governors to a combination of financial incentive and administrative scrutiny which they might periodically resist, but could not afford to ignore altogether. Additionally, the Act effectively silenced 'central-local' friction in police governance within Leeds itself. Its passing thus marked a measured triumph for the central state, which secured a fair degree of oversight of provincial forces. Just as important, however, were internal developments within local governance, which promoted a more outward-looking approach amongst local authorities. An aspiration to keep pace with police provision elsewhere was evident by at least the 1830s, yet the swifter turnover of chief constables in the second half of the century institutionalised a new spirit of auto-critique and improvement within the police establishment. Additional local studies, also adopting an extended chronology, are needed to assess whether other cities followed a similar trajectory to Leeds; yet on the basis of this example -and the parallels elsewhere already noted -it seems that much existing work provides a simplistic analysis of local government. Greater attention must be paid to the reach of the central state and the influence of municipal networks, in order to arrive at a more balanced view of police governance and local political control in the nineteenth century.
